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BRATTv. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES

I.

INTRODUCTION

On July 16, 1984, in Bratt v. International Business Machines,l
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts clarified the right of em
ployers to use personal information about their employees. Address
ing libel and invasion of privacy claims, the court defined the
standards employers must follow when disclosing private employee
information. 2
The court held that employers have a conditional privilege3 to
disclose defamatory facts about an employee, if the disclosure reason
ably serves a legitimate business interest in the employee's job compe
tence. 4 In addition, the court ruled that employers can be held liable
for abusing the privilege but only upon a minimum showing of reck
lessness, whether or not the disclosed information was medical.5 The
court also held that conditional privileges do not apply to claims
brought under the Massachusetts right to privacy statute. 6 Rather, in
invasion of privacy actions against an employer, an interest balancing
test will be applied: 7 an employer's legitimate business interest in us
ing private information about an employee must outweigh the intru
sion on the employee's privacy.8 The same test applies when medical
information is involved. 9
The supreme judicial court addressed these issues in response to
seven questions certified to it from the United States Court of Appeals
1. 392 Mass. 508,467 N.E.2d 126 (1984).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 512-13, 467 N.E.2d at 131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 593
and scope note (1977).
4. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 509, 512-13,467 N.E.2d at 129, 130-31.
5. Id. at 509, 517,457 N.E.2d at 129, 133.
6. Id. at 510,519-20,467 N.E.2d at 129, 135. The right of privacy statute states: "A
person shall have a right against unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with his
privacy. The superior court shall have jurisdiction in equity to enforce such right and in
connection therewith to award damages." MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 214, § IB (West
Supp. 1984).
7. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 510, 520-21,467 N.E.2d at 129, 135-36.
8. Id. at 509-10, 520-22,467 N.E.2d at 129, 135-36.
9. Id. at 522, 467 N.E.2d at 136.
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for the First Circuit. 10 The action underlying this decision originated
in the Superior Court for Middlesex County, Massachusetts, but was
removed to the United States District Court for the District of Massa
chusetts on the defendant's diversity motion. I I
II.

THE FACTS

The plaintiff, Robert Bratt, was employed by International Busi
ness Machines Corporation (IBM) for approximately eight years prior
to the events that generated this action.12 During that period, Bratt
occasionally complained to IBM's management 13 about the low qual
ity of his evaluations, the sparcity of his promotions and raises, and
IBM's failure to implement his suggestions for improving the com
pany.14 After one fruitless grievance meeting with IBM's personnel
director, Bratt mentioned to his supervisor that he had been suffering
from headaches, nervousness, and insomnia. IS In response, his super
visor recommended a check-up with the corporation's physician. 16
After the doctor examined Bratt, he phoned Bratt's supervisor and
reported that Bratt was "paranoid" and should see a psychiatrist.l7
10. Id. at 508-09, 467 N.E.2d at 128. The certifed questions were:
"In the case of a libel claim, when defendant has a conditional privilege, does loss of
that privilege through 'unnecessary, unreasonable or excessive publication,' . . . require
more than ordinary negligence?" Id. at 512 n.7, 467 N.E.2d at 130 n.7 (citations omitted).
2. "If so, does abuse of the privilege through such publication result from something less
than recklessness?" Id.
3. "Is the standard for abuse through excessive publication the same when the defamatory
matter published is medical information?" Id. at 516 n.12, 467 N.E.2d at 132 n.12.
4. "Can disclosure of private facts about an employee among other employees of a corpo
ration constitute sufficient publication to infringe the employee's right of privacy?" Id. at
517 n.14, 467 N.E.2d at 133 n.14.
5. "Is there a conditional privilege for legitimate business communications under the
Massachusetts right of privacy statute?" Id. at 519 n.16, 467 N.E.2d at 134 n.16.
6. "If so, what are the standards for abuse of that privilege?" Id.
7. "Are the same privilege and standard for abuse applicable in the case of medical infor
mation?" Id. at 521 n.20, 467 N.E.2d at 136 n.20. See MASS. SUP. JUD. Cr. R. 1:03.
11. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 509, 467 N.E.2d at 128.
12. Id. at 510, 467 N.E.2d at 129.
13. IBM maintained an "open door" policy grievance system whereby employees
could air their complaints directly to higher management when their immediate superiors
did not settle their problems satisfactorily. Id. at 510 & n.6, 467 N.E.2d at 129 & n.6.
14. Id. at 510-11, 467 N.E.2d at 129-30. The court failed to discuss the nature of
Bratt's suggestions. The personnel director, however, told him that they simply were not
implemented, and that, in any event, he should not be concerned with achieving any per
sonal recognition for making suggestions, as that was "part of his job." Id. at 511, 467
N.E.2d at 130.
15. Id. at 511, 467 N.E.2d at 130.
16. Id.
17. Id.
1.
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Bratt's supervisor relayed that opinion through another supervisor to
IBM's personnel director. IS
After IBM denied another of Bratt's grievances, his supervisor
noted Bratt's reaction as "distraught and crying."19 The supervisor
informed the personnel director of Bratt's behavior and the personnel
director in turn distributed a memorandum to at least two other man
agerial persons, complete with his personal impression that Bratt had
mental problems extending beyond IBM.20 Meanwhile, Bratt's super
visor made an appointment for him with a psychiatrist. The personnel
director asked the medical director to confer with the psychiatrist to
determine Bratt's employment competency.21 Bratt's suit claimed that
the personnel director's memorandum libeled him, and that disclosure
of his grievances and medical evaluations to inappropriate personnel
violated his statutory right of privacy.22

III.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Employer's Conditional Privilege to Publish Defamatory
Information

Before the Bratt decision, the supreme judicial court had recog
nized the existence of a privilege to publish defamatory information. 23
The privilege applied, however, only under the condition that publica
tion be reasonably necessary for a legitimate business interest. 24 The
Bratt court relied upon Galvin v. New York, New Haven & Hartford
Railroad for its discussion of the nature of conditional privileges. 25 In
Galvin, the court had explained that conditional privileges could be
18. Id. at 511,467 N.E.2d at 130.
19. Id.
20. /d.
21. Id. at 511-12,467 N.E.2d at 130.
22. Id. at 512, 467 N.E.2d at 130. See supra note 6.
23. See Galvin v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 341 Mass. 293, 168 N.E.2d 262
(1960). Accord, Underwood v. Digital Equip. Corp., 576 F. Supp. 213, 217 (D. Mass.
1983).
24. Id. at 296-97, 168 N.E.2d at 265-66. See McCone v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel., 393
Mass. 231, 235-36, 471 N.E.2d 47,50-51 (1984) (same privilege applied to employee evalu
ations); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 594 (1977). The law recognizes many types
of conditional privileges. See, e.g., Sheehan v. Tobin, 326 Mass. 185, 190-91, 93 N.E.2d
524, 528 (1950) ("where the publisher and the recipient have a common interest and the
communication is of a kind reasonably calculated to protect or further it." (quoting W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 837 (1941»; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 595-598A (1977) (conditional privileges also exist for certain personal interests,
common interests, public interests, family relationships, and state officers). See generally
37 MASS. PRAC., Tort Law 143-45 (1979).
25. 341 Mass. 293, 168 N.E.2d 262 (1960).
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abused, and thereby forfeited, "by an unnecessary, unreasonable or ex
cessive publication of the defamatory matter,"26 such as loud and re
peated pubic accusations in the presence of a growing crowd of
onlookers.27 The court, however, had not fully defined the standard by
which such abuse had to be proved, although it stated that "actual
malice" was not required. 28 Nonetheless, the Bratt court looked to
Galvin for guidance, inasmuch as it seemed "to favor recklessness or
'malice in fact' as the standard. "29
In determining what should be the minimum standard for abuse,
the Bratt court looked to Massachusetts case law and the RESTATE
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. 3o The court relied upon Retailers Com
mercial Agency, Inc., Petitioners,3' in which it had held that "[m]alice
in uttering false statements may consist either in a direct intention to
injure another, or in a reckless disregard of his rights and of the conse
quences that may result to him."32 The supreme judicial court has
also found knowledge of falsity,33 lack of reason to believe the truth,34
or reckless disregard for the truth 35 of a publication to constitute
abuse of a conditional privilege. These holdings, combined with the
Restatement's annunciation of the policy reasons behind conditional
privileges,36 led the court to conclude that nothing less than reckless
26.
27.

Id. at 297-98, 168 N.E.2d at 266.
Id. In Galvin, several railroad policemen confronted a fellow officer with loud

accusations of theft. The incident occurred on a street comer, and attracted a crowd of
fifty or sixty. Id. at 294-95, 168 N.E.2d at 264-65.
28. Id. at 297, 168 N.E.2d at 265-66. Earlier cases established that actual malice or
"malice in fact" would constitute abuse of a conditional privilege. See Doane v. Grew, 220
Mass. 171, 176, 107 N.E. 620, 621-22 (1915).
29. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 513, 467 N.E.2d at 131 (referring to the statement in Galvin:
"We think that the time has now come to recognize that there can be an abuse of a condi
tional privilege by conduct which cannot fairly be classified as express or actual malice."
Galvin v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 341 Mass. 293, 298, 168 N.E.2d 262, 266 (1960».
See 37 MASS. PRAC., Tort Law 157 (1979).
30. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 514-15, 467 N.E.2d at 131-32.
31. 342 Mass. 515, 174 N.E.2d 376 (1961).
32. Id. at 521, 174 N.E.2d at 380 (quoting Gott v. Pulsifer, 122 Mass. 235, 239
(1877».
33. Tosti v. Ayik, 386 Mass. 721, 726, 437 N.E.2d 1062, 1065 (1982).
34. Sheehan v. Tobin, 326 Mass. 185, 192,93 N.E.2d 524, 529 (1950) (citing Atwill
v. Mackintosh, 120 Mass. 177, 183 (1876».
35. Tosti v. Ayik, 386 Mass. 721, 726,437 N.E.2d 1062, 1065 (1982). Accord Ezekiel
v. Jones Motor Co., 374 Mass. 382, 390, 372 N.E.2d 1281, 1287 (1978).
36. Policy considerations require an unrestricted flow of certain types of information
to facilitate and maintain our social and economic structure. In some cases, the threat of
defamation liability might impair communication in situations in which society wishes to
encourage free communications. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Vol. 3 at 258 (1977).
See Bratt, 393 Mass. at 515 n.l1, 467 N.E.2d at 132 n.11; 37 MASS. PRACT., Tort Law 143
(1979). See also DiSilva v. Polaroid Corp., No. 83-W631, slip op. (Mass. App. Div. Jan. 4,

1984]

RECENT DECISION

341

ness could establish abuse of a conditional privilege. 37
At the time the court considered the Bratt suit, the question of
whether medical information should be treated similarly to other de
famatory information, for the purposes of conditional privileges, had
not yet been determined in Massachusetts. The Bratt court found that
it should,38 recognizing that employers "have a legitimate need. . . to
determine whether or not their employees are professionally, physi
cally and psychologically capable of performing their duties."39 Any
defamatory information disclosed during the process of making such a
determination, therefore, is conditionally privileged and the reckless
ness minimum standard obtains. 4O
B.

The Employee's Right to Privacy

Separate from his common law libel claim, Bratt raised an inva
sion of privacy claim under the Massachusetts right of privacy stat
ute. 41 Earlier, the supreme judicial court had interpreted the statute as
"proscrib[ing] the required disclosure of facts about an individual that
are of a highly personal or intimate nature when there exists no legiti
mate countervailing interest."42 The court had not previously decided,
1985) (civil rights laws may require employers to investigate complaints of discrimination,
thereby necessitating by law the use of potentially defamatory information concerning the
alleged offender).
37. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 515-16, 467 N.E.2d at 132. Any standard less than reckless
ness, such as negligence, would defeat the very purpose of the conditional privilege. See
supra note 36.
38. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 516-17, 467 N.E.2d at 132-33. See Hoesl v. United States,
451 F. Supp. 1170, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Leonard v. Wilson, 150 Fla. 503, 505, 8 So. 2d
12, 13 (1942); Cochran v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 72 Ga. App. 458, 461, 34 S.E.2d 296, 298
(1945).
39. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 516, 467 N.E.2d at 133 (quoting Hoesl v. United States, 451
F. Supp. 1170, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 1978». While the Bratt court relied heavily upon Hoes! for
this principle, it did not go so far as to agree with the Hoes! court that the employer has a
duty to make such determinations of fitness. Hoes!, 451 F. Supp. at 1176. See infra note 61
and accompanying text.
40. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 517, 467 N.E.2d at 133. Interestingly, the court discussed
two principles peculiarly applicable to the facts of Bratt: first, many courts would not find
an "oblique or hyperbolic" imputation of mental disorder defamatory; and second, a clear
statement to an employer that an employee had a specific mental condition that made him
incompetent was "defamatory on its face." Id. at 516 n.13, 467 N.E.2d at 133 n.13 (quot
ing Hoesl v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1170, 1172-73 (N.D. Cal. 1978». Other than
stating that it agreed with these principles, the court offered no explanation for positing
them. One may speculate, however, that the court meant them as helpful, albeit unsolic
ited, suggestions to the federal court for the proper disposition of the case.
41. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 517-19, 467 N.E.2d at 133-34. See supra note 6.
42. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 518, 467 N.E.2d at 133-34. The Massachusetts legislature
apparently intended to give the courts complete control over the development of privacy
law, an area with great potential for growth in proportion to the expansion of modern
technology. The broad wording of the statute gives the judiciary considerable room in
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however, whether intracorporate communication constitutes sufficient
publication to violate a plaintiff's statutory right of privacy.43 Because
no definite precedent existed, the court sought guidance from analo~
gous cases. One case had held that the right of privacy statute prohib
ited employers from requesting "unreasonably intrusive, personal
information" from their employees by intracorporate questionnaire. 44
In another case, transmittal of defamatory material to geographically
separate divisions of the same company had constituted publication
for the purposes of a libel action. 45 Reasoning from these cases, the
court concluded that an employer's disclosure of private information
to the employee's fellow workers constituted sufficient pUblication
under the statute. 46
Unlike libel actions, however, "Massachusetts case law does not
recognize a conditional privilege, as such, for legitimate business com
munications under the right of privacy statute."47 Since no condi
tional privilege exists, no need arises for a standard of abuse. 48
Nevertheless, the court did not bar the employer's right to use perwhich to work. See supra note 6. See Note, The Massachusetts Right of Privacy Statute:
Decoy or Ugly Duckling?, 9 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1248, 1252-54 (1975).
43. The court noted that the phrasing of the question assumed that publication was
necessary for an invasion of privacy. While warning that such an assumption might not be
valid, the court answered the question in the context given. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 517 n.14,
467 N.E.2d at 133 n.14.
44. Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 307-08, 431 N.E.2d 908, 912 (1982)
(questionnaire submitted to regional sales personnel aimed at uncovering reason for poor
sales). Cf Broderick v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 368 Mass. 33,44, 330 N.E.2d 199, 206
(1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1048 (1976) (police commissioner's questionnaire, regarding
certain officers' misconduct at a police social event, did not infringe on officers' right of
privacy because activities were done in public and, a fortiori, were not private).
45. Riceman v. Union Indemnity Co., 278 Mass. 149, 151-52, 179 N.E. 629, 630
(1932) (letter accusing plaintiff of bootlegging was mailed in Boston to other divisions of
insurance company in New York and Kansas City).
46. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 519, 467 N.E.2d at 134. The court noted that the Massachu
setts concept of the tort of invasion of privacy differs from the Restatement version. The
latter requires communication of private information to the public at large, whereas the
former requires mere disclosure of personal facts. Id. at 519 n.15, 467 N.E.2d at 134 n.15;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
47. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 519-20, 467 N.E.2d at 135. The court cited no authorities,
and the author could not find any, to support this bald assertion. Perhaps the court was
drawing a logical conclusion, i.e., since no conditional privilege can coexist with a reasona
bleness balancing test, then no such conditional privilege exists. See infra text accompany
ing note 49.
Although making such a clear-cut conclusion obviously answered the First Circuit's
fifth question in the negative, the court proceeded to explain what standard stood in place
of the conditional privilege, thereby qualifying its answer. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 521 & n.20,
467 N.E.2d at 136 & n.20. See supra note 10.
48. The court thus declined to answer the sixth certified question. Bratt, 392 Mass.
at 521, 467 N.E.2d at 136. See supra note 10.
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sonal information about its employees. "[B]ecause [the right to pri
vacy statute] only proscribes unreasonable interference with a person's
privacy, legitimate countervailing business interests in certain situa
tions may render the disclosure of personal information reasonable
and not actionable under the statute."49 Hence, the test to be applied
in ascertaining whether an interference is unreasonable requires a bal
ancing between "the seriousness of the intrusion on the employee's
privacy" and "the employer's legitimate interest in determining the
employees' effectiveness in their jobs."50 Courts have used essentially
the same balancing test to determine priority between conflicting legal
rights in most situations. 5I
When medical information is involved, however, the presence of
an additional policy consideration alters the proportional weight of the
interests involved under the balancing test. 52 The Bratt court ac
knowledged that Massachusetts does not recognize a doctor-patient
evidentiary privilege. 53 In fact, the supreme judicial court has tended
to disfavor "claims of privilege" that seek to inhibit judicial explora
tion of the truth. 54 Nonetheless, the Bratt court recognized that there
is a legitimate "public interest in preserving the confidentiality55 of a
49. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 520, 467 N.E.2d at 135. The court dismissed the remarkable
similarity between its description of when an invasion of privacy might be reasonable and
when a conditional privilege for business interests might exist by admitting that the stan
dard "may, in some instances, be the same," but claiming to "prefer to adhere to the lan
guage of our cases." Id. at 521 n.19, 467 N.E.2d at 136 n.19.
Notably, the Bratt court consistently ignored the words "substantial or serious,"
which appear in the simply worded statute. See supra note 6. The court also failed to
address the disjunctive grammatical structure of the sentence in which those words appear,
i.e., "unreasonable, substantial or serious interference" (emphasis added). The grammar
implies three types of interferences with privacy, whereas the court discussed the statute as
though it encompassed only one.
50. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 520, 467 N.E.2d at 135. See Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385
Mass. 300, 308, 431 N.E.2d 908, 913 (1982).
51. See, e.g., Hastings & Sons Publishing Co. v. Treasurer of Lynn, 397 Mass. 812,
817-18, 375 N.E.2d 299, 303-04 (1978) (municipal employees' privacy interest in payroll
records falls to taxpayers' superior interest in knowing the salaries); Harrison v. Humble
Oil & Refining Co., 264 F. Supp. 89, 92 (D.S.C. 1967) (debtor/employee's privacy interest
falls to creditor/third party's superior legitimate business interest in seeking payment from
debtor's employer by disclosing the debt to him).
52. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 523, 467 N.E.2d at 137.
53. Id. at 522 n.22, 467 N.E.2d at 136 n.22. See Kramer v. John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 336 Mass. 465, 467, 146 N.E.2d 357, 359 (1957).
54. Cronin v. Strayer, 392 Mass. 525, 532-33,467 N.E.2d 143, 148 (1984). See P.J.
LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 174 (5th ed. 1981).
55. In the context of the statutorily established psychotherapist-patient evidentiary
privilege, see infra note 56, the proposed Massachusetts Rule of Evidence define a confiden
tial communication as one "not intended to be disclosed to third persons, except persons
present to further the interest of the patient in consultation, examination, or interview,
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physician-patient relationship."56 This public interest assumes that a
patient ought to feel free to tell his doctor all information necessary for
proper treatment, secure that the information will go no farther than
the doctor's office. 57
Because of the public policy concern, the court would generally
allow disclosure of confidential medical information only "under. . .
compelling circumstances, . . . to a person with a legitimate interest
in the patient's health."58 The court noted, however, that a difference
exists between the ordinary confidences of a patient to his private phy
sician and those of an employee to his employer's company doctor. 59
In the latter case, traditional notions of the doctor-patient relationship
do not apply.60 Because the employer pays the company doctor for
the specific purpose of evaluating the employee's fitness to work, the
physician's primary duty flows not to the patient but to the em
ployer. 61 The employer's interest in aspects of the employee's health
persons reasonably necessary for transmission of the communication, or persons who are
participating in the diagnosis and treatment. . . ." MASS. R. EVID. 503(a)(3) (Proposed
Official Draft 1980), reprinted in, 8 MASS. LAW. WEEK. 1231 (September 1, 1980). See
Commonwealth v. Clemons, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 580, 583 n.2, 427 N.E.2d 761, 764 n.2
(1981); Bratt, 392 Mass. at 523 n.23, 467 N.E.2d at 137 n.23.
56. Id. at 523, 467 N.E.2d at 137. See Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 336, 181 A.2d
345, 349 (1962); Ryan v. Bd. of Reg. in Med., 388 Mass. 1013, 1013-14,447 N.E.2d 662,
663 (1983). While no statutory rule in Massachusetts protects a doctor-patient evidentiary
privilege, the court acknowledged that the legislature "implicitly" demonstrated a concern
for a confidential relationship between them by several related statutes. Bratt, 392 Mass. at
522-23 n.22, 467 N.E.2d at 136 n.22. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12G (West
1983) (pertaining to non-liability of physicians for release of medical information required
in the public interest); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. lll, § 70 (West 1983) (allowing in
spection of hospital records upon judicial order or proper authorization); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. Ill, § 70E (West 1983 & Supp. 1984) (confidentiality of hospital records);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. Ill, §§ 1l0B, 202, & ch. lIID, § 6 (West 1983) (records of
fetal mortality and certain diseases are confidential); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112,
§ 12F (West 1983) ("all information and records kept in connection with the medical or
dental care of a minor. . . shall be confidential between the minor and the physician or
dentist"). Note that MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20B (West Supp. 1984), created a
statutory privilege between psychotherapists and their patients, but that the supreme judi
cial court thought it to be inapplicable to the facts of Bratt. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 522 n.22,
467 N.E.2d at 137 n.22. See Hannaway v. Cole, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 847, 848, 311 N.E.2d
924, 925 (1974) (rescript opinion).
57. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 522-23, 467 N.E.2d at 136-37. See Hague v. Williams, 37
N.J. 328, 336,181 A.2d 345, 349 (1962). "A personal relationship of trust and confidence
must exist between a physician and his patient." Levy v. Bd. of Reg. & Discipline in Med.,
378 Mass. 519, 528, 392 N.E.2d 1036, 1041 (1979).
58. Bratt, 392 at 523, 467 N.E.2d at 137 (quoting Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328,
336, 181 A.2d 349 (1962).
59. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 522 n.21, 467 N.E.2d at 136 n.21.
60. Id.
61. Id. See Jones v. Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co., 118 Minn. 217, 219,136 N.W. 741
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that bear on his job competency,62 then, would seem to outweigh com
pletely the employee's privacy in virtually anything he might tell the
company doctor. 63
IV.

CONCLUSION

The significance of the Bratt decision rests on several bases. By
assigning a reckless standard to abuse of conditional privileges, the
court has set a fairly clear outer boundary for employers. The right to
privacy balancing test established in Bratt, however, is unpredictable
in that it requires a case-by-case analysis. Employers may, nonethe
less, appreciate both aspects of the decision because the court has rein
forced the recognition that employers need a certain degree of freedom
in dealing with employee information, particularly medical informa
tion affecting job competency, in order to manage their businesses
effectively.
Employees, on the other hand, face a diminished respect for the
sanctity of personal information. They make take solace, however, in
two aspects of the decision. First, the Bratt court did not grant em
ployers unrestrained freedom to malign their employees. There are
reasonable limits. Second, the court recognized the right of an em
ployee to sue under the right to privacy statute for intracorporate mis
use of personal information. In so doing, the court gave employees a
method of protecting what right to privacy they have retained.
It is difficult to determine how the supreme judicial court will
apply the new standards in future cases. One fact is clear, however:
the court attempted to remain neutral in the employer/employee con
flict. While recognizing that both sides possess legitimate interests in
private information, the court gave neither an unfair advantage.

Howard A. Nunes

(1912) (applying principle of respondeat superior to the company doctor and the company);
and Hoesl v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1170, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (if the physician
"downplays or even fails to mention a deficiency affecting [work] fitness, the employer's
legitimate interest . . . is frustrated").
62. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
63. The doctor, of course, continues to owe the employee a duty of reasonable care
and skill according to the standards of the medical profession. Bratt, 392 Mass. at 522
n.21, 467 N.E.2d at 136 n.21.

